Military operations are intricate, dynamic, and fluid. For these reasons, military commanders and planners regularly rehearse, train, exercise, and simulate operational scenarios so they are better prepared to face such challenges in real-world situations. Domestic civil support operations in response to emergencies or disasters present a challenging operational environment full of legal, financial, and even political barriers unique only to domestic missions.
While commanders value the ability to maintain a flexible, adaptive, and agile response capability, there are, for better or worse, bureaucratic obstacles in the form of processes and procedures that must be considered when operating domestically in support of civil authorities. As an added challenge, large-scale incidents often involve both state-controlled National Guard and Active Component forces. Despite similar operational capabilities, the non-federalized National Guard forces and Active Component forces operate under distinctly different sets of laws and policies, which only serve to further complicate an already difficult mission.
We have seen throughout recent history some of the challenges faced by military forces supporting civil authorities. In recent years, legislative changes have led to the adoption of a newly established command mechanism designed to improve state and federal military coordination efforts during civil support operations. This dual status commander (DSC) initiative has shown promise during planned civil support events such as national political conventions and summits, as well as other special security events including the Olympics and Super Bowls. However, until Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, the DSC had not been used for a no-notice/limited notice incident response. Sandy provided our first opportunity to witness the DSC construct in motion during an unplanned response effort. As expected, there were several successes with this first time implementation that, in the minds of many, validated the concept and encouraged future use. Conversely, the response experienced some notable challenges.
The military's emphasis on after action reporting is valuable in that it helps to articulate lessons learned and opportunities for improvement during future operations. These reports are regularly sent to the service Centers for Lessons Learned where they are consolidated and published for broad dissemination to subscribers. Readers digest the information, and some commanders may even consider the recommendations for employment in future missions. While doctrine writers incorporate these lessons into doctrinal change and future concepts, the existing processes remain generally ineffective in transforming lessons learned into improvements in tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additionally, they are relatively useless for guiding operational planning and strategy development. With ineffective methods to integrate lessons learned, there is no way to promote consistent and continuous process improvement of complex military operations. So while military operations do not currently benefit from continuous process improvement efforts, military contracting and other
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Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press similar programs do. In fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) currently uses structured process improvement techniques and methods in a range of functions as a way to monitor performance, identify areas of weakness, and steer improvement efforts toward performance enhancement and maturity. We believe that these same process improvement techniques currently used and endorsed by DoD in nonoperational department activities can provide an ideal platform to launch a structured improvement plan aimed at maturing complex civil support operations under the DSC construct.
As such, this monograph advocates for the integration of process improvement methods into future Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. It briefly discusses alternative process improvement strategies and their current state of employment in a variety of DoD programs. Among the methods discussed are Lean Six Sigma, Total Quality Management, and Capability Maturity Models. We also demonstrate the utility of such methods and articulate the value in applying process improvement methods to DSCA operations. Using material from our earlier Strategic Studies Institute case study examining the Hurricane Sandy response in New York, we chose three recommendations to demonstrate how a usable process maturity model can be built and employed for future operations. We conclude the monograph by reaffirming the inherent utility of, and advocating for, process improvement techniques as a way to mature future DSCA operations using the dual status commander arrangement. 
